نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
The Fifth Development Plan (1973–1977), the final national development program of the Pahlavi II era, was launched under circumstances in which the world was experiencing the 1973 oil crisis and Iran's oil revenues increased abruptly and unprecedentedly. Annual oil income rose from approximately USD 5 billion in 1972 to more than USD 20 billion in 1974. This sudden revenue shock, coupled with the Iranian economy's structural inability to absorb such an extraordinary influx of financial resources, gave rise to severe inflationary pressures and widespread distortions in the markets for goods and services. Adopting a descriptive–analytical approach, this study provides a comprehensive examination of Iran's economic conditions during this critical period and highlights the profound gap between the objectives of the Fifth Development Plan and its actual implementation. It argues that this divergence resulted primarily from inefficient resource management, the ineffectiveness of executive institutions, and the lack of coordination among macroeconomic policies. The findings indicate that the excessive injection of liquidity into the economy—mainly through expanding government expenditures and extending bank credit without corresponding productive capacity—far exceeded the economy's absorptive capacity and generated substantial inflationary pressures.
کلیدواژهها English
