The Fifth Development Plan (1973–1977), as the final development program of the second Pahlavi era, was launched at a time when the world was confronting the 1973 oil crisis and Iran's oil revenues surged suddenly and unprecedentedly so much so that annual oil income rose from approximately $5 billion in 1974 (1351 SH) to over $20 billion by 1975 (1353 SH). This positive revenue shock, coupled with the structural unpreparedness of Iran's economy to absorb such a massive influx of financial resources, laid the groundwork for severe inflationary crises and widespread distortions in the goods and services markets. The present research, adopting an analytical-descriptive approach, undertakes a more detailed examination of Iran's economic conditions during this critical period, emphasizing the profound disconnect between the Plan's formulated objectives and the implementation realities stemming from resource mismanagement, inefficiency of executive institutions, and a lack of coordination among macroeconomic policies. Research findings indicate that the massive injection of liquidity into the economy primarily through expanded government expenditures and bank credit facilities lacking productive backing far exceeded the economy's actual absorptive capacity, thereby generating intense inflationary pressures.